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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In late January and early February 2021, an astounding story of stock 
market price volatility captivated the nation.  GameStop, a corporation that 
in recent years had prodigiously lost money – $492 million two years earlier, 
$296 million the last year for which it reported data – rose from a low of 
$2.57 to a high of $483.  In January 2021 alone, GameStop had risen from a 
closing price of $17.25 on January 4 to a close of $347.61 on January 27 
before falling 44 percent to a close of $193.60 on January 28, rising 68 
percent to a close of $325 on January 29, then falling 31 percent to a close 
of $225 on February 1, 2021, followed by a painful collapse of 82 percent to 
a close of $40.59 on February 19, 2021, before rebounding to close at $300 
by March 12, 2021. 
The GameStop saga involved a dizzying cast of characters.  The 
securities broker-dealer Robinhood had stopped entering buy orders for 
investors on January 27-28, 2021, prompting 30 private lawsuits by February 
7, 2021, as well as Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of 
Justice investigations, two State Attorney General investigations and United 
States House of Representatives and Senate hearings, galvanized in part by 
calls from such polar opposite politicians as Representative Alexandra 
Ocasio-Cortez and Ted Cruz, who previously had agreed on virtually 
nothing. 
Fingers were pointed in many directions starting with Robinhood for its 
trading halt, hedge funds such as Melvin Capital Management that had short 
sold GameStop, Citadel Securities through whom Robinhood directed 
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orders, social media platforms such as Reddit and its subchannel or subreddit 
WallStreetBets which had amassed some 8.5 million users to swap 
investment ideas and trading stratagems; and Keith Gill, who for months had 
made recommendations through social media and YouTube broadcasts 
promoting purchases of GameStop and traded under the unforgettable 
moniker of Roaring Kitty.  Press accounts reported that Gill had parlayed a 
$53,000 initial investment into a value on paper as high as $48 million before 
the stock price collapsed.  There were multitudes of retail investors who 
bought GameStop, some as young as 18 or 19 with little or no experience in 
securities market trading who purchased GameStop for a variety of motives 
including some who sought to cause losses to hedge funds through a short 
squeeze by which those who sell short seeking to profit from price declines 
by selling first and buying back later are stuck with massive losses when a 
stock’s price rises.1  For these investors, “sticking it to Wall Street” was a 
 
* Joel Seligman is President Emeritus and University Professor at the University of Rochester and 
Dean Emeritus and Professor at Washington University School of Law. 
 1. See Game Stopped? Who Wins and Loses When Short Sellers, Social Media, and Retail Investors 
Collide”: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 117th Cong. 31 (2021) [hereinafter 
Hearings] (statements of Keith Gill; Kenneth Griffin, Chief Executive Officer, Citadel LLC; Steve 
Huffman, Chief Executive Officer, Co-Founder, Reddit; Gabriel Plotkin, Chief Executive Officer, Melvin 
Capital Management LP; Vladimir Tenev, Chief Executive Officer, Robinhood Markets, Inc.; Jennifer 
Schlup, Director of Financial Regulation Studies, Cato Institute); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FINANCIAL 
SERVICES, 117TH CONG., COMM. MEMORANDUM for GAME STOPPED? WHO WINS AND LOSES WHEN 
SHORT SELLERS, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND RETAIL INVESTORS COLLIDE (Comm. Print 2021);“Public 
Statement, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Statement of Acting Chair Lee and Comm’rs Pierce, Roisman 
& Crenshaw Regarding Recent Market Volatility (Jan. 29, 2021) (on file with author); Matthew 
Goldstein, A GameStop Evangelist’s Videos Draw a State Regulator’s Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2021, at B6; Omar Faridi, More than 30 Lawsuits Now Filed Against Stock Trading App Provider 
Robinhood Markets Inc., Suits Allege Company is Manipulating Markets, CROWDFUNDER INSIDER (Feb. 
7, 2021, 8:21 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2021/02/171985-more-than-30-lawsuits-now-
filed-against-stock-trading-app-provider-robinhood-markets-inc-suits-allege-company-is-manipulating-
markets; Nathaniel Popper & Matt Phillips, Robinhood Takes Heat In Congress, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 18, 
2021), at B1. 
The lawsuits alleged a variety of claims. For example, in Nelson v. Robinhood Financial LLC, No. 
1:21-cv-00777 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 24, 2021) (BL), the suit alleged that Robinhood’s January 27-
28, 2021 actions that restricted users from placing buy orders and cancelled completed buy orders for 
GameStop and a small number of other stocks and options was in violation of Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority Rule 5310 which requires FINRA members to “make every effort to execute a 
marketable customer order that it receives promptly and fully.”  The plaintiffs sued Robinhood for breach 
of contract, breach of the implied covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, negligence, breach of 
fiduciary duty, violations of the Deceptive Business Practice section of N.Y.C. Code §20-700; Deceptive 
Acts and Practices under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 and 350, and unjust enrichment. 
A quite different lawsuit was filed by Iovan v. Gill, No. 3:21-cv-10264 (MGM) (D. Mass. filed Feb. 
16, 2021) (BL), alleging that Gill had falsely represented himself as an amateur investor while in fact 
being an experienced securities broker, investment adviser and chartered financial analyst who for nine 
years had been President of Debris Publishing Inc., which provided financial software to research and 
portfolio companies and persons. For the past two years, Gill had been Financial Wellness Director at 
MassMutual and was registered with MassMutual as a securities broker.  By February 14, 2021, Gill had 
approximately 415,000 subscribers to his YouTube Channel and 158,300 Twitter followers.  The suit 
alleged a series of violations of the Securities Exchange Act including stock price manipulation and 
violations of the basic fraud provision Rule 10b-5. MassMutual was alleged to have violated its duty to 
supervise Gill as a registered broker-dealer and was responsible as a control person of Gill. 
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way to assert the democratization of finance reminiscent of the 2011 
occupation in New York City that triggered the populist opposition 
movement Occupy Wall Street, which used the slogan “We are the 99%” to 
signify opposition to wealth holdings by the Top 1 percent.2 
Time will tell whether any of this activity was illegal, but it already is 
clear that on most issues that received media attention such as Robinhood’s 
practices with respect to trading halts, alleged fraudulent recommendations 
to purchase GameStop stock or options, short selling, market manipulation 
through short squeezes, the Securities and Exchange Commission already 
has a full armament of enforcement tools, as does the Department of Justice 
and to a lesser degree State Attorneys General.3 
Unlike the contagion that followed the initial period of mortgage broker 
and investment banker failures in the 2008-2009 financial meltdown and 
ultimately touched virtually every industry, more than doubling 
unemployment, there was virtually no contagion effect of the GameStop 
Tulipmania.4  The Treasury Department recognized after a meeting with 
representatives of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York that the securities markets’ “core infrastructure was 
resilient during high volatility and heavy trading volume.”5 
The saga of GameStop, Robinhood, Reddit and Roaring Kitty, however, 
does involve a profound area of long overdue securities regulation policy 
concern.6  The business model of Robinhood aptly demonstrates why the 
structure of our securities markets urgently needs revision.  On December 
17, 2020, a mere six weeks before the calamitous events of January 27-28, 
2021, Robinhood settled an SEC Administrative Cease-and-Desist 
 
 2. See, e.g., Mark Engler, Let’s End Corruption – Starting with Wall Street, NEW 
INTERNATIONALIST MAG. (Nov. 1, 2011), https://newint.org/features/2011/11/01/wall-street-corruption-
protests; Hundreds of Occupy Wall Street Protestors Arrested, BBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2011), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-15140671. 
 3. Quite a separate question is presented as to whether the SEC or Department of Justice has 
effectively used its prosecutorial discretion to enforce these laws. In recent years, Columbia University 
Professor John C. Coffee, among several others, including Federal District Court Judge Jed Rakoff, has 
powerfully criticized the underenforcement of the Federal Securities Laws and laws directed at White 
Collar criminal and civil misconduct. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., CORPORATE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: 
THE CRISIS OF UNDERENFORCEMENT (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc. 2020). 
 4. See JOEL SELIGMAN, MISALIGNMENT: THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER AND THE FAILURE OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 1, 1-141 (Wolters Kluwer 2020). 
 5. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement by Jennifer Schlup) (noting further that GameStop’s 
market capitalization, even at its peak, was around $24 billion in an approximately $50 trillion market). 
 6. The use or abuse of social media by virtually every actor in the GameStop saga involves a 
separate fundamental policy issue beyond the scope of this article. Other securities law topics such as 
short selling have been frequently addressed by the Federal Securities Laws and most recently are subject 
to a detailed Regulation SHO. See 7 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 127, 127-97 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2017). 
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Proceeding without admitting or denying the findings of the Commission.7  
The Commission’s Order stated in part: 
Robinhood launched its retail brokerage business in 2015.  By mid-2018, 
it was one of the largest retail broker-dealers in the United States.  One of 
Robinhood’s primary selling points was that it did not charge its customers 
trading commissions.  In reality, however, “commission free” trading at 
Robinhood came with a catch: Robinhood’s customers received inferior 
execution prices compared to what they would have received from 
Robinhood’s competitors.  For larger value orders, this price difference at 
Robinhood exceeded the commission its competitors would have charged.  
These inferior prices were caused in large part by the unusually high 
amounts Robinhood charged the principal trading firms for the 
opportunity to obtain Robinhood’s customer order flow.  These payments 
are generally referred to as “payment for order flow . . .”  
 
As a broker-dealer that routed customer orders for execution, 
Robinhood had a duty to seek to obtain the best reasonably available terms 
for customers’ orders.  This duty is referred to as the duty of “best 
execution.”  From September 2016 through June 2019, while Robinhood was 
on notice that its high payment for order flow rates from principal trading 
firms could result in inferior execution prices for its customers, Robinhood 
violated its duty of best execution by failing to conduct adequate regular and 
rigorous reviews of the execution quality it was providing on customer 
orders.  Robinhood did not begin comparing its execution quality to that of 
its competitors until October 2018, and did not take appropriate steps during 
the entire period to assess whether its higher payment for order flow rates 
were adversely affecting customer execution prices.8 
The Commission’s Order highlights a fundamental weakness of 
securities markets today.  The original vision of the Securities Acts 
Amendments of 19759 and the May 1, 1975 unfixing of brokerage 
commission rates10 was securities markets and broker dealers that would 
compete on the basis of best price and best execution.  That vision has been 
subverted by the practice of payment for order flow and associated practices 
by which securities markets and marketmakers compete to pay for orders.11   
This Article in Part II describes the original vision and early actions of 
the Commission.  Part III describes the Commission’s 1994 Payment for 
 
 7. Robinhood Financial LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, Exchange Act Release No. 90694, 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,764 (Dec. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Robinhood Order]. 
 8. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3, 5. 
 9. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). 
 10. 6 LOSS ET AL., supra note 6, at 231-335 (5th ed. 2016). 
 11. See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 
1998). As the Commission explained in the Robinhood Order “[t]he duty of best execution derives from, 
among other sources, the common law agency duty of loyalty, which obligates an agent to act exclusively 
in the principal’s best interest.” Robinhood Order, supra note 7, at ¶ 14. 
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Order Flow Release and associated practices.12  Part IV concludes with a 
better way forward. 
II.  THE ORIGINAL VISION 
In 1975, the Commission and Congress took two dramatic steps to 
transform United States securities trading. 
On May 1, 1975. popularly soon known as May Day, the SEC adopted 
then Rule 19b-3 to prohibit any exchange from adopting or retaining any rule 
or practice that required its members to charge fixed commission rates for 
transactions executed on or by use of the facilities of the exchange.13 
Shortly thereafter, as part of the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments, 
Congress enacted §6(e), with limited fail safe exceptions, to prohibit any 
exchange from imposing any schedule or fixing commission rates, 
allowances, discounts, or other fees charged by its members.14 
The ending of fixed commission rates, a hallmark of NYSE trading 
since its proverbial founding under a Buttonwood tree in 1792, precipitated 
a revolution in how securities were traded.  Because broker-dealers 
competed on price, commission rate levels precipitously declined.  Between 
May 1, 1975 and the end of 1980, a study conducted by the Commission’s 
Directorate of Economic and Policy Analysis calculated that commission 
charges computed as a percentage of the principal value of securities 
transactions had declined 57 percent for institutional investors and 20 
percent for individual investors.  Even commission rates paid by individuals 
on orders of less than 200 shares declined 6 percent during this period when 
computed on a percentage of principal basis.15 
The Commission estimated that, in dollars and cents terms, investor 
savings for the year 1976 alone had amounted to $485.3 million.16 
With the emergence of discount brokers, further commission rate 
savings soon occurred.  Between 1976 and the fourth quarter of 1980, the 
market share of discount brokers grew from less than 0.4 percent to 6.0 
percent, with newspaper advertisements for discount brokers regularly 
 
 12. Exchange Act Release No. 34,902, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
85,444, 1994 WL 587790 (Oct. 27, 1994). 
 13. Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-3, Exchange Act Release No. 11,203, 6 SEC 
Docket 147, 1975 WL 161946 (Jan. 23, 1975). See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET, at 466–86 (3d ed. 2003) for a detailed history of the six year effort by the SEC, Department of 
Justice and Congress to unfix commissions. 
 14. Section 6(e)(1)(B) was expressly characterized as a failsafe provision with respect to fully 
competitive commission rates in the S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URB. AFFAIRS, S. Rep. No. 94-75, 
at 72–73 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N 179, 250–51. 
 15. DIRECTORATE OF ECON. & POL’Y ANALYSIS, SEC, STAFF REPORT ON THE SECURITIES 
INDUSTRY IN 1980, 83–85, 92–94, apps. F1-F2 (1981). 
 16. HAROLD M. WILLIAMS, SEC, 5TH REP. TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECT OF THE ABSENCE OF FIXED 
RATES OF COMMISSIONS, at iii (May 26, 1977). 
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appearing in the financial press promising rates 50 to 90 percent less than 
full-service brokerage houses.17 
A pivotal reason why discount brokers such as Charles Schwab could 
offer lower commission rates was that they did not need to “bundle” trade 
execution with the provision of research.  Congress in 1975 enacted §28(e) 
in the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments, which created a safe harbor for 
institutional investors that purchased brokerage and research for a higher 
commission than they could have expended if only purchasing brokerage.  
Often this is called a soft dollar arrangement.  Congress acted in response to 
the view of some institutional money managers “that, with the advent of 
competitive rates, they must direct a payment of no more than the lowest 
commission obtainable for a transaction, or else they will be subject to suit 
for violation of their fiduciary obligations.  This result will occur, they 
conten[d], without regard for the quality of the broker’s execution and 
settlement service or the research information which he may provide.”18  But 
§28(e) critically does not inhibit brokers who prefer unbundling services to 
reduce investor expense. 
In 2000, the Commission further enhanced investors’ capacity to 
receive the benefits of price competition in trading by requiring the stock 
exchanges and NASDAQ to supplant their pricing of securities in minimal 
increments of 1/8th or beginning in 1997 1/16th of a dollar with decimal to 
trading price increments of 5 cents or fewer.  Decimalization reduced the 
price differentials between bid and ask quotations and made more favorable 
execution prices.19 
Beginning in the late 1960s, the SEC undertook steps towards creation 
of a central market in which all transactions in a given security, whether 
listed on the dominant New York Stock Exchange, or on a regional stock 
market permitted to multiply trade stocks listed on the NYSE during the 
period, would be centralized into a single order execution system in which 
investors would receive the best execution of their orders by continuous 
matching of the highest priced buy orders against the lowest priced sell 
orders. 
The heart of the New York Stock Exchange’s stock market was its 
specialist system.  Buy and sell orders, regardless of where in the country 
they originated, usually were communicated to the Exchange floor, where 
floor brokers would carry them to the post of the specialist who made a 
market in that security.  If volume in a security was sufficiently active, the 
floor broker could execute the order by matching it against a reciprocal order 
 
 17. Id. at 48; SEC, supra note 15, at 85-86, 102. 
 18. HARLEY ORRIN STAGGERS, SECURITIES REFORM ACT OF 1975, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-123 (1975). 
See LOSS ET AL., supra note 10, 294-332 for the subsequent history of §28(e). 
 19. SEC Release Notice, Exchange Act Release No. 42,914, 2000 WL 816861 (June 8, 2000); 
Decimal Trading in Subpennies, Exchange Act Release No. 44,568, 2001 WL 811111 at *1 n.3 (July 18, 
2001) (NASDAQ Decimalization Study reported on average that quotes and spreads had fallen by 50 
percent after decimalization). See 5 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 518, 518-22 (6th ed. 2021) for other studies. 
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of another floor broker standing in front of the specialist’s post or against an 
agency order on the specialist’s book.  When buy and sell orders could not 
be matched, the Exchange specialist would function as a dealer, trading for 
his own account to ensure an orderly and continuous market.  Alternatively, 
the floor broker could enter a limit order in the specialist’s book to be 
executed at a specified price above or below the current market. 
The NYSE then was an auction market, which by transmitting most 
orders to a central point could keep offers and bids tighter and best protect 
investors.  This narrowing of spread in theory worked best when the 
proportion of trades was greatest on the floor of a single Central Market, as 
was the case for the NYSE.  The risk with a central auction market was that 
if the NYSE was the only Central Market, the incentive for the specialist to 
narrow spreads was reduced.  Because of this risk, the SEC had long 
supported regional markets to provide some competition to the NYSE and 
limit potential abuse of the NYSE’s historic monopoly power.20 
The floor monopoly of the NYSE also was challenged by the growth of 
block trades, typically of 10,000 or more shares which by 1999 comprised 
50.2 percent of NYSE trading.  NYSE block trading overwhelmed the ability 
of the NYSE specialist and floor traders to handle large buy or sell orders 
without major disruptions.  Block trades were assembled off the exchange 
floor to improve the prices received by institutional investors and other large 
investors.21 
The alternative form of stock market trading was through the over-the-
counter (OTC) market which involved hundreds of OTC marketmakers in 
securities broker-dealer firm trading rooms long informed by stock market 
prices in the daily Pink Sheets published by the National Quotation Bureau, 
providing buy and sell (bid and asked) prices of each stock for the previous 
day.  Beginning in 1971, a revolution occurred in the OTC market when the 
NASDAQ electronic market began providing electronically continuous 
quotations for each security allowing broker-dealers to route orders to the 
OTC marketmakers with the best buy or sell quotation.  Predictably, an 
effective system of competitive quotations improved prices for securities 
customers.  One study calculated that between 1970 and 1972, the mean 
market spread of a sample of OTC stocks fell from 0.4871 to 0.4028 or 17 
percent mean price improvement.22  As an increased number of newspapers 
began publishing OTC quotations, NASDAQ volume as a percentage of 
NYSE volume grew from 32 to 44 percent between 1974 and 1979.  The 
NASDAQ approach was the near opposite of the NYSE central auction 
 
 20. This insistence on competition dates back at least to 1936, when the SEC, reversing the intention 
of §12(f) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, persuaded Congress to permit the continuation of unlisted 
trading on the regional exchanges. Such multiple trading of securities limited the ability of the NYSE to 
monopolize trading in its listed securities.  SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 138-40. 
 21. 6 LOSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 458-62. 
 22. James L. Hamilton, Marketplace Organization and Marketability: NASDAQ, the Stock 
Exchange and the National Market System, 33 J. FIN. 487, 495 (1978). 
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market.  NASDAQ was based on competitive dealers as the means to narrow 
price spreads.  This, too, was an imperfect system.  If each dealer operated 
independently, buy and sell order spreads would widen when the 
independent dealers received too few orders to create an effective market.  
The NASDAQ quotation system helped counteract this potential 
fragmentation of the market by identifying other dealers to offset buy and 
sell orders.23 
The NASDAQ market could trade NYSE and other exchange listed 
stocks with comparable savings.  An April 1972 NASD test of 84 stocks 
traded in the “third market,” that is OTC trading of exchange listed stocks, 
found that one third of the time, OTC quotations were better for investors 
than those offered on the NYSE.  The New York Stock Exchange Rule 394, 
later denominated Rule 390, then prohibited NYSE members from buying or 
selling securities on the third market.  As former SEC attorney Thomas 
Russo and Assistant Professor William Wang wrote, in a 1972 law review 
article: “If Rule 394 were eliminated, NASDAQ might gradually supplant 
the New York Stock Exchange.  If it were to survive, the Exchange would 
certainly be forced to adopt technological innovations it should have 
implemented long ago.”24 
By the early 1970s, it was possible to envision the contours of a new 
National Securities Market System.  Employing computer technology, all 
securities marketmakers – the Exchange specialists, the OTC dealers, the 
Exchange block positioners who traded large blocks typically of 10,000 or 
more shares off the Exchange floor – could be linked by a composite last sale 
and quotation reporting system.  Removal of Rule 394 and other barriers to 
market-maker competition would give the market greater “depth,” since the 
capital of more marketmakers would be available to handle temporary 
imbalances in supply and demand.  If each Exchange specialist’s limit order 
book was replaced with a systemwide limit order book, investors would have 
a more effective guarantee of best order execution.  The fragmentation of the 
securities market into numerous unconnected market centers could be 
prevented either by technology that automatically matched and executed best 
bids and offers or by a best execution rule that prevented any broker from 
executing a transaction when a better price was available elsewhere in the 
system.  Price spreads would be kept close by competing marketmakers and 
by centralizing volume within the electronic market.  Market orders would 
be executed by brokers or dealers through NASDAQ desk consoles.  The 
brokers or dealers would match buy or sell orders against the systemwide 
limit order book or against the entries of other brokers and dealers.  
Simultaneously, the central computer facility could record the transaction on 
 
 23. NASD FACT BOOK 29, 32 (1979); NYSE FACT BOOK 63 (1980). 
 24. William K.S. Wang & Thomas A. Russo, The Structure of the Securities Markets, 41 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1, 39 (1972). 
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a systemwide transaction tape and arrange securities clearance and 
settlement.25 
In 1972, the SEC published its Statement on the Future Structure of the 
Securities Markets, which stated in part: 
 
The central market system we look toward . . . would entail, among other 
things, the following elements: 1.  Implementation of a nationwide 
disclosure or market information system to make universally available 
price and volume in all markets and quotations from all marketmakers.  2.  
Elimination of artificial impediments, created by exchange rules or 
otherwise, to dealing in the best available market.  3.  Establishment of 
terms and conditions upon which any qualified broker-dealer can attain 
access to all exchange. . . . [and] 4.  Integration of third-market firms into 
the central market system. 
 
The SEC intended to enhance: 
 
the competition which now takes place among the separate exchange 
markets and between all of them and the third market [while] centralizing 
all buying and selling interest and maximizing market-maker capability 
. . . so that securities can be bought and sold at reasonably continuous and 
stable prices, and to ensure that each investor will receive the best possible 
execution of his order, regardless of where it originates.26 
 
In March 1973, the SEC issued a Policy Statement on the Structure of 
a Central Market System, articulating how such a National Market System 
could be achieved.  Three broad projects were envisioned: First, creation of 
a systemwide communications system.  Second, since “the most important 
objective of the system is to foster the development of strong competition 
among its participants,” the statement called for the elimination of 
unjustifiable impediments to marketmaker competition.  Specifically, the 
Statement noted that “restrictions such as Rule 394, regardless of their past 
appropriateness, are incompatible with a central market system and will have 
to be rescinded by the time the quotation system is in operation.”  Finally, 
the Statement anticipated creation of a systemwide specialist limit order 
book.27 
 
 25. Institutional Membership on National Securities Exchanges: Hearing on S. 1164 and S. 3347 
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. On Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affairs, 92nd Cong. 33-51 
(1972). H.R. Rep. No. 92-1519, at 117-30 (1972). Morris Mendelson, Nostalgic vs. the Computer, 4 SEC. 
L. REV. 503 (1972). 
 26. SEC, STATEMENT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE 
STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 1, 7-9 (1972). 
 27. SEC, SEC POLICY STATEMENT OF THE STRUCTURE OF A CENTRAL MARKET SYSTEM. (1973). 
The statement was vague about details of the systemwide limit order book and execution system, 
providing little or no discussion of such questions as the technology to be employed, how the systemwide 
limit order book and execution system would be linked to the systemwide communications network, and 
whether NASDAQ’s facilities could or should be employed to bring the National Securities Market on 
line most rapidly.  To ensure that public orders would receive preferential treatment, the SEC’s 1973 
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The 1975 Securities Acts Amendments imperfectly provided a basis for 
the SEC to create a National Market System.  The SEC was granted enabling 
powers to “facilitate the establishment of a national market system for 
securities” in accordance with the fact findings and objectives of Subsection 
11A(a)(1) of the amendments.  That Subsection implicitly endorsed granting 
the SEC discretion to supervise creation of a central market consistent with 
the SEC’s 1972 and 1973 Statements concerning a future central market.28 
Over time, the Commission achieved much of the original vision of a 
National Market System. 
First, after several intermediate steps in 2000, the Commission 
approved the rescission of Rule 390, the principal restraint on New York 
Stock Exchange members trading OTC securities and allowing retail firms 
that were not specialists on regional exchanges to trade the full NYSE list of 
securities.29 
Second, the Commission adopted a Consolidated Reporting System to 
include continuous quotations and sales prices in every National Securities 
Exchange and every National Securities Association (meaning NASDAQ) 
security covered by required transaction plans.  The plans covered all 
National Market System or NMS stocks, which meant all exchange-traded 
securities and Nasdaq stocks unless trading during the most recent calendar 
quarter was de minimis (“one percent or less of the aggregate trading volume 
 
Statement did underline the Commission’s “commitment to the preservation of an auction-agency market 
rather than a purely ‘dealer market’ for listed securities.” 
 28. S. 249, 94th Cong. (1975) (enacted). Subsection 11A(a)(1) stated in its entirety: 
The Congress finds that – 
(A) The securities markets are an important national asset which must be preserved and 
strengthened. 
(B) New data processing and communications techniques create the opportunity for more 
efficient and effective market operations. 
(C) It is in the public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure – 
(i)  economically efficient execution of securities transactions; 
(ii)  fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between 
exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets; 
(iii)  the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of information with respect to quotations 
for and transactions in securities; 
(iv)  the practicability of brokers executing investors’ orders in the best market; and 
(v)  an opportunity, consistent with the provisions of clauses (i) and (iv) of this subparagraph, 
for investors’ orders to be executed without the participation of a dealer. 
(D) The linking of all markets for qualified securities through communication and data 
processing facilities will foster efficiency, enhance competition, increase the information 
available to brokers, dealers, and investors, facilitate the offsetting of investors’ orders, and 
contribute to best execution of such orders. 
 29. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 660-72. The SEC 2000 rescission of Rule 390 is in Sec. Ex. 
Act Rel. 42,758, 72 SEC Dock. 889 (2000); SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 514-34. In 1980, the 
Commission had adopted Rule 19c-3 prohibiting Rule 390 and other restrictions on trading stock listed 
after April 26, 1979. 
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for such securities as reported pursuant to an effective transaction reporting 
plan or effective National Market System plan”).30 
Third, the Commission came up conspicuously short in its approach to 
order execution.  This was the pivotal issue in creating a National Market 
System and the issue on which the Commission’s great opportunity was 
decisively missed. 
By the mid 1970s, the SEC had a clear choice.  The Commission could 
facilitate development of an electronic securities market in which brokers 
and dealers could view all available quotations including limit orders in a 
given security on a desktop screen and directly execute orders or make offers 
and bids by pressing keys on the computer console.  This model of National 
Market System popularly was known as a “hard CLOB” (or Composite Limit 
Order Book), which could automatically execute orders and throughout the 
late 1970s was most nearly approximated by the Cincinnati Stock Exchange. 
The Cincinnati hard CLOB system allowed brokers or dealers in their 
offices throughout the country or marketmakers on an exchange floor to 
enter bids and offers through computer terminals.  The system was updated 
instantly as each bid or offer was made.  When like priced bids and offers 
were entered into the system, an execution automatically occurred, based on 
a strict first come, first serve basis (that is the bidder or offeror making the 
first order at the appropriate price received the business – so-called price and 
time priority), with the significant exception that public investors’ orders 
were given priority over marketmakers’ orders.  The system itself made no 
pricing decisions, but it did allow a broker or dealer the opportunity either to 
accept an outstanding bid or offer by making a reciprocal offer or bid or to 
try for a better price by entering a new offer or bid.  When a transaction was 
executed, the execution was instantly displayed to the buyer and the seller 
on their respective terminals.   
The advantages of a Cincinnati-type hard CLOB system were 
significant. 
The system provided an efficient composite quotations system that was 
integrated with the equipment necessary to make bids and offers or execute 
transactions. 
The system could eliminate the problems associated with lack of 
firmness of quotes, ensure best execution of customers’ orders, and route 
orders to the best market. 
The system provided strict price and time priority, which was essential 
if public investors’ orders were to be executed at the most favorable price 
existing at the time.  Strict price and time priority eliminated the advantages 
of being on the floor of the exchange and effectively placed stock market 
specialists, floor traders, and all other brokers and dealers, wherever 
physically located, on an equal competitive footing. 
 
 30. See generally Regulation NMS, 17 CFR §242.600-613; LOSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 678-746.  
Covered NMS securities are defined in Regulation NMS Rule 600(b)(77). 
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In addition, during the late 1970s, a Cincinnati Hard CLOB system 
possessed the potential of being less costly to operate than existing securities 
markets because the existing markets were more reliant on manual 
operations and more complicated communications systems.  In 1978, Donald 
Weeden, who had invested in the Cincinnati experiment, estimated that the 
annual cost of handling limit orders alone could be cut from $50 million to 
$500,000. 
Finally, if all bids and offers were entered into the system, the problems 
associated with SEC or self-regulatory organization market surveillance 
would have been eased, since the system would preserve a complete record 
of all bids, offers, and transactions. 
The Cincinnati hard CLOB approach, if it were used for all securities 
trading, could create the near equivalent in the securities industry to what 
economists call “perfect competition.”  All brokers and dealers would have 
an equal opportunity to vie for profit, with equal access to a nationwide 
computer system and equal information.  For investors this would mean that 
all bids and offers in the computer system could interact, with best bid always 
able to meet best offer, and with the greatest possible competition among 
marketmakers.  Ultimately, a hard CLOB would have made it possible for 
institutional investors, or all investors, to enter bids or offers directly, without 
a broker. 
Politically, however, achieving acceptance of a Cincinnati-type hard 
CLOB then proved impossible.  A hard CLOB system inevitably would lead 
to more effective marketmaker competition at the expense of the existing 
securities exchanges.  At the very least, a hard CLOB system would make 
floor brokers and physical exchange floors unnecessary.  In place of floor 
brokers congregating at specialists’ posts to shout orders in an “auditory 
crowd,” there would be brokers and dealers in their offices throughout the 
country, creating the equivalent of a “visual crowd,” as they communicated 
bids and offers via computer consoles and visual displays.  Although the 
Cincinnati system did not preclude the existence of specialists, it would 
reduce their commission income by withdrawing from them the exclusive 
franchise to run a specialist book. 
Because of the threat to their existence, other securities exchanges 
vehemently opposed the Cincinnati hard CLOB system.  The exchanges 
complained that the Cincinnati system would permit a sizable share of orders 
to be executed by broker-dealers in-house and would end the use of floor 
brokers to negotiate market prices.  The exchanges urged that a best 
execution rule could prohibit broker-dealer firms from internalizing order 
flow unless they gave investors prices at least equal to the best prices 
available elsewhere in the market system.  The exchanges emphatically 
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agreed with the Pacific Coast Exchange that “the Cincinnati system is not an 
appropriate design for the national system.31 
The failure of the SEC to require exchanges and broker-dealer 
communities to implement a hard CLOB system reduced the National 
Market System to a series of second best choices. 
As an alternative to a hard CLOB system, the stock exchanges favored 
a National Market System that preserved the exchange floors’ central role.  
Beginning in April 1978, the American, Boston, Midwest, New York, 
Pacific, and Philadelphia stock exchanges began operating the Intermarket 
Trading System (ITS).  ITS was a communications system allowing 
specialists and floor brokers on one exchange floor to transmit buy or sell 
orders to marketmakers on another exchange floor.  If a specialist or floor 
broker saw a better price on the composite quotations system available on 
another exchange, the ITS system allowed him to transmit a “commitment 
to trade” to the appropriate marketmaker on that exchange.  The 
marketmaker there would either accept the commitment or could decline.  If 
there was no response to the initial commitment to trade, the commitment 
would automatically expire after a designated time period. 
There were important differences between a hard CLOB system and 
ITS.  Brokers and dealers could utilize a Cincinnati-type system from their 
offices.  The ITS system required orders first to be routed to an exchange 
and then allowed only specialists and floor brokers to have access to the ITS 
computer consoles.  A hard CLOB system permitted automatic execution of 
orders.  ITS allowed marketmakers to reject orders even when they earlier 
had published quotations indicating that they would transact business at the 
order price.  Alternatively, specialists could increase their bid to match better 
offers in the system.  This discouraged competitive quotations, because the 
New York Stock Exchange specialist could discourage an NYSE member 
from trading elsewhere by matching an off-the-floor quotation.  A hard 
CLOB system automatically matched highest bids and lowest offers.  As 
originally designed, ITS was a discretionary system, and could not guarantee 
that investors would receive best order execution.  A Cincinnati-type system 
would have one systemwide limit order book against which all brokers and 
dealers could execute orders.  The ITS system continued separate specialists’ 
limit order books on each exchange.32 
 
 31. The Cincinnati hard CLOB system was described in Progress Toward the Development of a 
National Market System: Hearing on The Functioning and Administration of Securities Acts Amendments 
of 1975 Before the Subcomm. On Consumer Protection and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Com. House of Representatives, 96th Cong. at 6-7, 85, 93, 132-50, 250-51, 277-85, 475; S. Rep. No. 96-
IFC 56, at 28. SEC, A MONITORING REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE CINCINNATI STOCK EXCHANGE 
NATIONAL SECURITIES TRADING SYSTEM (1981); BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BL) No. 458, (June 21, 
1978), at A10-A14, No. 461, (July 12, 1978), at A2-A3, No. 472, (Oct. 4, 1978), at A4. 
 32. See SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 522-34; The Intermarket Trading System (ITS) described in 
Progress Toward the Development of a National Market System, supra note 31, at 6-7, 70-88, 132-50, 
250-51; S. Rep. No., supra note 31, at 21; SEC, A MONITORING REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE 
16 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18:1 
Separately, the Commission approved a separate second-best system to 
automate routing of orders from brokers directly to specialists’ posts.  In 
1976, the New York Stock Exchange had begun operating its Designated 
Order Turnabout (DOT) system to permit member firms to reduce their costs 
(by avoiding the expense of floor brokerage) and improve their efficiency in 
handling small orders (initially market orders up to 299 shares; limit orders 
up to 500 shares).  By 1979, DOT orders accounted for some 10 percent of 
all reported NYSE share volume.  DOT never fully caught on.  By 1999, its 
trading volume was only 2 percent of aggregate consolidated tape volume.  
It was likened to “two tin cans and a string” or a “tom-tom in the space age.”33   
“Some regional exchanges,” a 1980 House Commerce Subcommittee 
Report explained, “compete with the New York system by offering even 
more streamlined alternative systems.  For example, the computerized 
system of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange automatically executes small 
orders and guarantees that they are executed at the better price on the 
Philadelphia or the New York Stock Exchange.  Similarly, the Pacific Stock 
Exchange recently installed a system which provides automatic execution 
for small orders at the highest bid or lowest offer of any markets that 
participate in the Intermarket Trading System.”34  In 1981, the NASD 
commenced pilot operations of an enhanced NASDAQ system, known as the 
Computer Assisted Execution System (CAES).  CAES enabled broker-dealer 
firms to route, buy and sell orders for automatic execution by any authorized 
OTC market-maker disseminating quotations through the NASDAQ system.  
Broker-dealer firms could route market orders or limit orders and could 
designate a particular market-maker with the best quotation, to whom the 
order would be routed, as  , determined by price and time priorities.35 
In 1981, the SEC issued an order requiring the securities exchanges 
participating in the ITS system and the NASD to implement, by March 1, 
1982, an “automated interface” between the ITS and NASDAQ systems, 
including a broker to market-maker order routing system and automatic 
 
INTERMARKET TRADING SYSTEM 5-9 (1981); BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BL) 432, (Dec. 14, 1977), at A6-
A7, No. 449, (Apr. 9, 1978), at A7-A8, No. 478, (Nov. 15, 1978), at A1 and A5. 
By 1999, there were 207.6 billion shares traded with capabilities to handle 1000 messages per 
second including market orders up to 30,099 shares and limit orders up to 99,999 shares.  NYSE FACT 
BOOK 23-25 (1999).  Beginning in 1983, to deal with the slowness of DOT, the NYSE secured approval 
of an enhancement under which a report of an automatic execution by a specialist if the specialist did not 
respond within five, later three, minutes.  Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 19,896, 28 SEC Dock. 190 (1983); LOSS ET 
AL., supra note 19, at 637. 
 33. Progress Toward the Development of a National Market System, supra note 31, at 143, 191-93; 
NYSE FACT BOOK 26, 28 (1999); Richard E. Rustin, Driving Force: As Big Board President, John J. 
Phelan Pushes Changes in Wall Street, WALL ST. J., 16 (Sept. 2, 1980). 
 34. S. Rep., supra note 31, at 9. See also discussion in Milton Cohen, A National Market System: A 
Modest Proposal, 46 GEORGE WASH. L. REV. 743, 766-68 (1978); Progress Toward the Development of 
a National Market System, supra note 31, at 70. 
 35. SEC, MONITORING REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS AND EFFECTS OF RULE 19C-3 UNDER THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 38-41 (1981). 
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execution capability.36  The initial significance of the ITS-NASDAQ linkage 
and order routing system was to enable  brokers or dealers to route orders 
automatically to the exchange specialist or OTC market-maker with the best 
price in a Rule 19c-3 third market security.  An August 1981 SEC 
Monitoring Report found that without an automated interface, it was rarely 
economical for a broker manually to route a small order to an OTC market-
maker in a 19c-3 security,even when the OTC market-maker had a superior 
price.  For this reason, relatively few OTC firms had attempted to provide 
competitive market-making in 19c-3 securities.37 
The most difficult issue today in the New Stock Market involves market 
fragmentation.  In 2015, as Merritt Fox, Lawrence Glosten and Gabriel 
Rauterberg generalized: 
 
How stocks are traded in the United States has been totally transformed.  
Gone are the dealers on NASDAQ and the specialists at the NYSE.  
Instead a company’s stock can now be traded on up to sixty competing 
venues where a computer matches incoming orders.  High frequency 
traders post the majority of quotes and are the preponderant source of 
liquidity in the new market.38 
 
In 1998, the Commission adopted Regulation ATS for Alternative 
Trading Systems to allow order execution systems the choice of whether to 
register as a National Securities Exchange or to register as a broker-dealer 
and comply with additional requirements depending on activity and trading 
volume.  The ATS broker-dealers are exempted from the definition of 
exchange under Securities Exchange Act Rule 3a1-1(a) and provide 
operation reports to the SEC under Rules 300-303 of Regulation ATS.  As 
of March 2021, there were 60 ATS systems reporting to the SEC and 24 
stock and option exchanges.  The ATS systems included dealers trading as 
dark pools: dealers who trade anonymously without publicly disclosing their 
limit order books and restrict access to their limit order books.  Dark pools 
have had a profound impact on stock market structure.  Between when the 
SEC adopted Regulation NMS (for National Market System) until 2014, the 
NYSE share of trading stock in the NYSE list shrank from 78.9 to 20.1 
percent.39 
 
 36. SEC, A MONITORING REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE INTERNET MARKET TRADING SYSTEM 
4 (1981). 
 37. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17744 (Apr. 21, 1981); For the background of this Order, 
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14416 (1978); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17516 
(1981); S. Rep., supra note 31, at 31-32, 42-43. 
 38. Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense 
and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L. J. 191, 191 (2015). See also MERRITT FOX, LAWRENCE GLOSTEN & GABRIEL 
RAUTERBERG, THE NEW STOCK MARKET: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY (2019). 
 39. LOSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 450-62; Fox et al., supra note 38, at 271-77. SEC DIV. OF TRADING 
& MARKETS, RULE 611 OF REGULATION NMS 10 (Apr. 30, 2015); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
83663 (2019) (amendments to Reg. ATS); MERRITT B. FOX, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, EDWARD F. 
GREENE & MENESH S. PATEL, SECURITIES MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 21-22, 166-171 
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Underlying much of the change in market structure was the rise of High 
Frequency Trading (HFT), which by 2014 accounted for over 50 percent of 
total volume in the United States.  There is no widely accepted definition of 
High Frequency Trading, but HFT typically employs high speed 
communications, private data feeds and algorithmic trading strategies to 
rapidly enter, cancel and update quotations.  HFT came to dominate market-
making because of its superior speed.40   
During the first six months of 2009, with the increased use of dark pools 
and HFT that could rapidly execute multiple small orders without the risk of 
price swings, only 6.8 percent of NYSE Group Volume in consolidated 
NYSE volume occurred through block trades.41 
HFT became notorious in 2014 when Michael Lewis harshly criticized 
dark pools, payment for order flow and the growing incomprehensibility of 
United States stock markets in his book, Flash Boys.  Lewis claimed that the 
stock markets were “rigged” and singled out for particular criticism 
“electronic front running,” by which High Frequency Traders submit buy or 
sell orders to market-makers or markets for periods as brief as 30 
milliseconds – 0.03 seconds – before they are routed to another market-
maker.  A flash order could gain valuable information regarding growing or 
declining demand for a security and trade ahead of other market participants 
profiting from superior knowledge of market trends.42 
In 2008, the NYSE ended its specialist system.  “The rise of the 
electronic hybrid market has fundamentally adhered to NYSE’s trading 
environment.”  In adopting the New Stock Market Model in favor of a system 
of designated market-makers with the ability to maintain hidden interests 
(that is, reserve interest without a minimum display required.  Among other 
high frequency traders) soon Virtel, Citadel and GTS became designated 
market-makers in the NYSE. 43 
In 2008, supplemental liquidity providers were created initially under a 
six-month pilot program, and could enter orders from off the exchange floor 
directly into exchange facilities.44  The Supplementary Liquidity Provider 
 
(2018). There are reporting requirements for Exchanges, OTC market-makers and ATS systems under 
Rules 605-606 of Reg. NMS. 
 40. Fox et al., supra note 38, at 95-128; SEC DIV. OF TRADING & MARKETS, EQUITY MARKET 
LITERATURE REVIEW PART II:  HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING (Mar. 18, 2014). 
 41.  See www.nyxdata.com/factbook (52,514.8 of 771,916.4 million in share volume.”  Cf. Ortega, 
Block Trades Disappear as Volatility, Losses Increase, BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov. 24, 2008). 
 42. LOSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 523–27, 595-98 (6th ed. 2021).; FOX ET AL., supra note 39, at 
263-69. 
 43. Self-Regulatory Organizations, SEC Release No. 34,58,845, 94 SEC Docket 1321, 1322-29 
(Oct. 24, 2008). 
 44. Supplemental Liquidity Providers, SEC Release No. 34,58,877, 94 SEC Docket 1407, 2008 WL 
4825954, (Oct. 29, 2008); Extending the Operation of its Supplemental Liquidity Providers, SEC Release 
No. 34,61,075, 97 SEC Docket 1035, 2009 WL 4362864 (Nov. 30, 2009). 
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Pilot was made permanent with the providers now registered as NYSE 
Market Makers.45 
The NASDAQ also profoundly changed under the pressure of dark 
pools and HFTs.  In 2001, the SEC approved NASDAQ’s SuperMontage 
system combining quote collection, quote display and order execution.46 
Tying together the new, highly fragmented securities markets is the 
SEC’s Order Protection Rule: Rule 611 of Regulation NMS.  The purpose of 
Rule 611 is to prevent trade throughs; automated trading that is outside the 
best bid or offer of a National Securities Exchange or NASDAQ.  When a 
market-maker receives an order and its quotations are outside the National 
Best Bid-Best Offer (NBBO), it is required to forward the order to other 
markets or market-makers quoting within the NBBO.  Rule 611 is 
controversial, and has been criticized for not protecting orders that are visible 
for at least one second.  Although Rule 611 requires price priority, it does 
not recognize time priority across markets.47  Questions can also be posed as 
to whether Rule 611 is consistent with the duty of best execution recognized 
in cases such as Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith.48  Under 
this duty, a broker-dealer is obligated to execute customer trading at the best 
reasonable available price, including prices superior to the NBBO. 
III.  PAYMENT FOR ORDER FLOW AND ASSOCIATED PRACTICES 
Much of what was achieved after 1975 improved markets for investors 
by providing narrower spreads and more advantageous buy and sell prices to 
investors as a result of unfixing commission rates, unbundling brokerage 
services, decimalization of stock prices, facilitation of new discount brokers, 
consolidating quotations and sales data, and ending anti-competitive rules 
such as NYSE Rule 390. 
The rejection of the hard CLOB system, in contrast, was the great 
opportunity lost.  Enough time and experience has transpired that we know 
that second best solutions such as DOT, ITS and the Order Protection Rule, 
have been unable to equal the potential of best execution by a hard CLOB. 
The widespread adoption of payment for order flow and broker-dealer 
internalization amplified the defects of the structural inadequacies of the 
 
 45. Supplement Liquidity Providers Final Approval, SEC Release No. 34,67,154, 103 SEC Docket 
2968, 2012 WL 2061575, (June 7, 2012). 
 46. SEC Approves SuperMontage, SEC Release No. 34,43,863, 74 SEC Docket 384, 2001 WL 
51588 (Jan. 23, 2001); Loss et al., supra note 34, at 654-59. 
 47. FOX ET AL., supra note 39, at 22-24, 157-63, 243-46. 
 48. Newton v. Merrill, 135 F.3d 266, 269-70 (3d Cir. 1996) (where the defendant was found to have 
violated its duty of best execution by executing retail customer orders at the NBBO while obtaining 
superior offsetting transactions for itself); see also In the Matter of Marc N. Geman, SEC Release No. 
43,963, 2001 WL 34643611 (Feb. 14, 2001). Cf. FINRA Rule 5310, BEST EXECUTION AND INTERPOSING, 
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/5310#the-rule (requiring a broker-dealer to 
use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for a security in any transaction or with a customer 
and to provide execution that is “as favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions.”). 
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post-1975 securities market structure.  As defined in Securities Exchange 
Act Rule 10b-10(d)(8), payment for order flow: 
 
shall mean any monetary payment, service, property, or other benefit that 
results in remuneration, compensation, or consideration to a broker or 
dealer from any broker or dealer, national securities exchange, registered 
securities association, or exchange member in return for the routing of 
customer orders by such broker or dealer to any broker or dealer, national 
securities exchange, registered securities association, or exchange 
member for execution, including but not limited to: research, clearance, 
custody, products or services; reciprocal agreements for the provision of 
order flow; adjustment of a broker or dealer’s unfavorable trading errors; 
offers to participate as underwriter in public offerings; stock loans or 
shared interest accrued thereon; discounts, rebates, or any other reductions 
of or credits against any fee to, or expense or other financial obligation of, 
the broker or dealer routing a customer order that exceeds that fee, expense 
or financial obligation. 
 
Payment for order flow allows broker-dealers to direct orders to dealers 
who internalize execution of stocks or options and pay a fee to the original 
broker-dealer for the order flow.  By 2016, the SEC would report that 
“internalization is believed to account for almost 100% of all marketable 
order flow.”49  Payment to large brokerage firms in 2014 ranged from $92 to 
$305 million.50 
There are variations on payment for order flow.  A market-taker fee, for 
example, is one in which exchanges or Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) 
“take” a fee by trading against a resting order and rebate to traders a “maker” 
fee for placing a nonmarketable limit order in the relevant limit order book.  
The SEC permits maker-taker fees under Rule 610, but regulates them with 
.3 cent per share limit under Regulation NMS Rule 610.  Maker-taker fees 
have been criticized for incentivizing brokers to route orders to the market 
center that pay the highest rebates.  Maker-taker fees can be rationalized as 
adding liquidity to the specific exchange or ATS. 51 
Payment for order flow was always controversial.  It was justified when 
it first became widespread as contributing to competition with the 
 
 49. CERTAIN ISSUES AFFECTING CUSTOMERS IN THE CURRENT EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE, SEC 
Memorandum, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/equity-market-structure/issues-affecting-customers-
emsac-012616.pdf (Jan. 26, 2016). 
 50. FOX ET AL., supra note 39, at 269, see generally Fox et al., supra note 38, at 289-93. 
 51. FOX ET AL., supra note 39, at 187-89, 257-58; Fox et al., supra note 38, at 281-88. It should be 
noted that Rule 610’s cap on the access fee effectively prevents a venue from undercutting the objective 
of the trade-through rule.  Without the cap, a venue could offer a very high rebate, essentially attracting 
very favorably priced quotes that would be subsidized by the prospect of the rebate, and funding the 
rebate with a very high access fee.  The trade-through rule would then dictate that a customer’s marketable 
order, wherever it was originally sent, be directed to the venue that had used this tactic to attract these 
very favorably priced quotes. 
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Exchanges, lowering commission rates, and providing more expensive 
execution and enhanced services.52 
But these theoretical advantages are outweighed by systematic evidence 
of disadvantages.53  Levitt in his Memoir, for example, recounted: 
[P]ayment for order flow was problematic in that “your buy order flow 
may not be exposed to a large number of sell orders, and that may deprive 
you of a better price.  . . .  Under SEC rules, your broker is obligated to get 
the best execution available for your order.  If your broker is funneling 
orders to the highest bidder and ignoring his best execution duty, you may 
be paying a lot more than shares than is necessary.54 
 
Nonetheless in 1994, the Commission issued its Payments for Order 
Flow Release,55 taking a disclosure approach to payment for order flow 
rather than an outright ban.  Even the Adoption Release expressed concern 
about whether securities customers were being treated fairly: 
Specifically, payment for order flow raises concerns about whether a 
firm is meeting its obligation of best execution to its customer.  Not all 
market centers expose market orders to other order flow or attempt to 
improve the price at which market orders are executed.  Thus, the decision 
to route an unpriced order to a market center offering immediate execution 
at the NBBO, could mean that the customer has lost an opportunity for 
execution at a superior price because of the lack of exposure to other order 
flow.56 
The disclosure requirements in Rule 10b-10, the Order Confirmation 
Rule, and what is now Rules 605 and 606 of Regulation NMS, did little to 
 
 52. DAVID S. RUDER & NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, PAYMENT FOR ORDER 
FLOW COMMITTEE, INDUCEMENTS FOR ORDER FLOW: A REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 24-26 
(1991). 
 53. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, The Perils of Payment for Order Flow, 107 HARV. L. REV. J. 1675, 
1678-1679 (1994). As explained in a 1994 Harvard Law Review Note: 
Despite the assertions of POF proponents that brokers who take part in payment for order flow 
arrangements do fulfill their duty of best execution by obtaining for customers the benefit of 
the quick, price guaranteed executions that characterize their market, structural incentives and 
the weight of the evidence both indicate otherwise.  Moreover, the problem of skewed 
incentives is exacerbated because customers are handicapped by information deficiencies. 
POF causes brokers to conduct their business in ways that, were they known to the customers, 
might not meet with the customers’ approval.  For example, customers may prefer to wait 
fifteen seconds or even half an hour and have the opportunity to price improve on the primary 
exchange rather than execute quickly at the best posted price; but customers are not given the 
opportunity to choose, because the broker – who benefits from the payment – exercises 
virtually invisible and therefore unchecked discretion.  Moreover, because the mechanics of 
order flow payment arrangements require execution in a predetermined market, the customer 
loses the benefit of trade by trade assessment of execution quality.  Also problematic is the fact 
that the customer does not get the premium paid by the dealer and so does not obtain the true 
best inside market price. 
 54. ARTHUR LEVITT & PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND 
CORPORATE AMERICA DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW, 29-30 (2002). 
 55. Payment for Order Flow, SEC Release No. 34,34,902, 57 SEC Docket 2315, 2012 WL 587790, 
(Oct. 27, 1994). 
 56. Id. at *3. 
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improve investor awareness of payment for order flow practices, investor 
involvement, or SEC oversight.  Rule 605’s execution quality data for market 
center and Rule 606’s reports on broker routing “are produced,” as one critic 
put it, “on a highly aggregated basis.  Data are produced monthly and are 
binned relatively coarsely.  If more detailed and precise execution quality 
reporting is produced, this may facilitate both better audits of executing 
brokers and enhance competition between internalizers.  This was the 
original purpose of the predecessor execution quality reports, but given the 
changes in technology of trading, the Rule 605 and 606 reports no longer 
effectively serve this purpose.”57 
The Commission in the Payment for Order Flow Release shied away 
from an outright ban on the logic that better disclosure of payment for order 
flow might lead to a “meaningful opportunity for price improvement” and in 
any event “would represent a radical change to the industry where the 
payment of cash or its monetary equivalent has become widespread.”58 
The problems with payment for order flow have persisted and if 
anything become more acute. 
In 2000, the Commission observed in the Release when the NYSE 
proposed rescinding Rule 390: 
 
From a broker’s perspective, one of the primary motivations for 
internalization and payment for order flow arrangements is the 
opportunity to share in the profits that can be earned by a marketmaker 
trading as principal against a substantial flow of market- makers.  Under 
internalization and payment for order flow arrangements, such orders are 
routed to a particular market-maker that will have an opportunity to 
execute the orders as principal without facing significant competition from 
investors or other dealers to interact with the directed order flow.  
Moreover, the linkages among market centers that are currently in place 
do not require that market orders be routed to the market center that is 
displaying the best prices, even if that price represents an investor limit 
order.  As a result, a market-maker with access to directed order flow often 
may merely match the displayed prices of other market centers and leave 
the displayed trading interest unsatisfied.  The profits that can be earned 
by a market-maker trading at favorable prices with directed order flow can 
then be shared with the brokers that routed the orders.59 
 
 57. FOX ET AL., supra note 39, at 269. 
 58. SEC Release No. 34,34,902 noted the Commission observed: 
In addition, banning payment for order flow has associated workability problems.  If the 
practice of cash payment for order flow were banned, because it is only one of many forms of 
inducement for order flow, the Commission has every reason to believe that an attendant 
increase in related “soft” inducements for order flow or internalization of order flow would 
follow.  Moreover, it would be impractical to attempt to ban solely soft practices (everything 
except monetary payment for order flow); such practices are difficult to monitor and industry 
participants would find alternative avenues for accomplishing the same result. 
Payment for Order Flow, SEC Release No. 34,34,902, at *8. 
 59. Joel Seligman, Rethinking Securities Markets: The SEC Advisory Committee and Market 
Information and the Future of the National Market System, 57 BUS. LAW. 637, 667 (2002). 
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Later in 2000, the Commission published a Report by the Commission 
Office of Compliance, Inspections and Examination and the Office of 
Economic Analysis, finding that many of the anticipated advantages of 
multiply listed options had been subverted by payment for order flow.  The 
Report stated in part: 
 
As a result of increased competition for options orders, practices that are 
commonplace in the equities markets quickly developed in the options 
market.  The most controversial of these practices is payment for order 
flow.  Over the last year, specialists, using their own money or money 
collected through the assessment of a transaction fee by the options 
exchanges, began paying order routing firms to send their customer 
options order to the exchange post where the specialist trades the options 
class.  Retail customer options orders are considered the most profitable 
because these orders are often uninformed, and specialists and market-
makers can profit from the spread or gain valuable market trend 
information from aggregate customer options order flow. 
 
The Staff found that the number of retail customers’ options orders paid 
for pursuant to payment for order flow arrangements has steadily increased.  
In fact, . . . in August 2000, in the most heavily traded options classes 
reviewed by the Staff, specialists paid for over 75% of the retail options 
orders.60 
A 2004 SEC Concept Release on Competitive Developments in the 
Options Markets61 amplified this critique describing it as used by both 
dealers who internalized and specialists on the options exchanges.  The 
Release described an additional inducement that exchanges use to attract 
order flow: 
 
[A] facilitation guarantee, whereby an upstairs firm that brings a large 
customer order to the exchange (typically at least 50 contracts) may trade 
as principal with a certain percentage (up to 40%) of the contracts in that 
order under certain circumstances.  Exchanges use facilitation guarantees 
to induce upstairs firms to execute their customer orders on the exchange 
by limiting the degree to which the exchange crowd may interact with 
those orders.  Like specialist guarantees, facilitation guarantees modify 
general exchange rules that assign executions based on priority, parity, and 
precedence, and like specialist guarantees and payment for order flow, 




 60. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 10, at n. 179, quoting Off. of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations, SEC, Special Study: Payment for Order Flow and Internalization in the Options Markets 
(Dec. 2000). 
 61. Competitive Devs. in the Options Markets, 69 Fed. Reg. 26, 6129 (proposed Feb. 9, 2004). 
 62. Id. 
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The Commission considered but did not later adopt a rule requiring 
broker-dealers to rebate to customers any payments received in exchange for 
routing orders to a particular exchange as one means to “mitigate much of 
the conflict.”63 
Far from payment for order flow proving to be a mechanism for greater 
price and quality competition, it has precipitated a race to the bottom and a 
pattern of erratic compliance with the duty of best execution. 
In 2008, the NYSE was authorized to pay rebates for order flow, an 
implicit concession that its traditional comparative advantages of price 
continuity, close spreads, and a near monopoly of trades were no longer 
effective.64 
In 2017, an SEC consent settlement with Citadel Securities, then 
responsible for 35 percent of the average daily volume of stock trading in the 
United States, illustrated that the best execution and order routing rules could 
be abused by a leading broker-dealer executing orders at the NBBO and 
superior prices its internal algorithms could identify from the fully displayed 
limit order book of the Exchange.  At that time: 
 
Exchanges sell various market data products, including “top of book” and 
“depth of book” data feeds.  Top of book data feeds provide the best 
priced, round lot quotations at the relevant exchange.  Depth of book feeds 
provide information about all displayed quotations, executions, and 
cancellations on the relevant exchange, and include information related to 
both round lot and odd lot orders.  Some market participants, including 
some wholesale market makers, purchase depth of book feeds for some or 
all of the exchanges, develop algorithms to process this data, and use this 
data to inform order handling decisions.  [Citadel] subscribed to a subset 
of exchanges’ depth of book feeds during the relevant period.65 
 
All of which brings us back to Robinhood in 2020.  The Commission 
recognized that payments for order flow and internalization practices 
provided price improvement on the vast majority of customer orders that a 
broker-dealer such as Robinhood sends to a principal trading firm such as 
Citadel, but also recognized that price improvement over the NBBO is not 
 
 63. Id. at 6135.  In 2007, the SEC Office of Compliance, Inspection and Examinations, the Division 
of Market Regulation and the Office of Economic Analysis in a subsequent Report Concerning 
Examinations of Options, Order Routing and Execution 12 (Mar. 8, 2007), reported: 
The Staff found that while there has been improvement over the last six years in order routing 
firms’ processes to seek and obtain best execution for their retail customers’ options orders, 
factors such as payment for order flow and other inducements continue to play a substantial 
role in broker-dealers’ order routing decisions. 
The Staff also found that because standardized execution quality statistics are not provided by 
each of the options exchanges, most firms analyze only the execution quality provided to their 
own customer orders.  The lack of standardized, widely available execution quality data may 
affect thorough best execution reviews by firms. 
 64. Exchange Act Release No. 58877, 94 S.E.C. Docket 1407 (Oct. 29, 2008). 
 65. Citadel Sec. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10280, Exchange Act Release No. 79790 at ¶ 20 
(Jan. 13, 2017). 
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the same as best execution.  As paragraphs 22-23 of the Consent Settlement 
delineated: 
 
22. At least one principal trading firm communicated to Robinhood that 
large retail broker-dealers that receive payment for order flow typically 
receive four times as much price improvement for customers than they do 
payment for order flow for themselves – an 80/20 split of the value 
between price improvement and payment for order flow. 
 
23. Robinhood negotiated a payment for order flow rate that was 
substantially higher than the rate the principal trading firms paid to other 
retail broker-dealers – which resulted in approximately a 20/80 split of the 
value between price improvement and payment for order flow.  Robinhood 
explicitly offered to accept less price improvement for its customers than 
what the principal trading firms were offering, in exchange for receiving 
a higher rate of payment for order flow for itself.66 
 
By October 2018, Robinhood was aware: “When certain Robinhood 
personnel began comparing the firm’s order execution quality . . . they 
learned for most effective quality metrics, including the percentage of orders 
receiving price improvement, Robinhood’s execution quality was worse.”67 
Matters deteriorated through June 2019: 
 
. . . By March 2019, Robinhood had conducted a more extensive internal 
analysis, which showed that its execution quality and price improvement 
metrics were substantially worse than other retail broker-dealers in many 
respects, including the percentage of orders that receive price 
improvement and the amount of price improvement, measured on a per 
order, per share, and per dollar traded basis.  Senior Robinhood personnel 
were aware of this analysis.  . . . 
 
However, Robinhood’s Best Execution Committee did not take 
appropriate steps to assess whether, in light of this information, Robinhood 
was complying with its duty to seek best execution of customer orders.  
Robinhood’s failure from October 2016 through June 2019 to conduct 
adequate regular and rigorous reviews that involved benchmarking its 
execution quality against competitor broker-dealers to determine whether it 
was obtaining the best terms reasonably available for customer orders, 
violated the firm’s duty of best execution.68 
Some 18 months later, the Commission secured its Administrative 
Cease and Desist Order, recovering a civil money penalty of $65 million and 
 
 66. Robinhood Financial, LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, Exchange Act Release No. 90694, 
at ¶¶ 22-23 (Dec. 17, 2020). 
 67. Id. at ¶ 28. 
 68. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30. 
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an undertaking by Robinhood to appoint an Independent Compliance 
Consultant acceptable to the Commission’s Staff.69 
For a firm of Robinhood’s size that the SEC allegedly had willfully 
violated the Federal Securities Laws, these were wrist slaps. 
More serious questions about securities and options market structure, 
the efficacy of voluntary compliance with standards as evanescent as the 
duty of best execution and when the SEC should seek a Consent Settlement 
of an Administrative Cease and Desist Order were not analyzed. 
IV. CONCLUSION: A BETTER WAY FORWARD 
The key to establishing a National Market System rather than today’s 
highly fragmented patchwork of securities exchanges, alternate trading 
systems, and broker-dealers which internalize and buy order flow is a more 
effective systemwide order execution system. 
The policy choice for the SEC and Congress can be stated simply.  Does 
the United States seek one securities market system in which all trade is on 
an equal footing, whether they be individual retail investors, institutional 
investors or dark pools, or are we willing to tolerate a superior market for 
insiders and privileged traders and a second-best market for retail investors?  
If we seek one market, this best can be achieved through a systemwide 
automatic execution system and CLOB.  Whether the expense of 
implementing this type of system to achieve further investor advantages can 
be costjustified is the fundamental practical question that requires study.  If 
a systemwide order execution system and CLOB was implemented, there 
would need to be careful evaluation of de minimis exceptions for thinly 
traded securities70 and how this new system could be harmonized with 
ongoing SEC initiatives such as that to create a Consolidated Audit Trail.71 
Alternatively, a more effective system-wide execution system could be 
achieved through requirement of automatic refund of payment for order flow 
to customers or by a total ban of payouts for order flow.  In either paradigm, 
a better-defined best execution rule would need to be implemented, backed 
 
 69. Id. at ¶ 48, § IV. 
 70. Commission Statement on Market Structure Innovation for Thinly Traded Securities, Exchange 
Act Release No. 87327, 2019 WL 7565770 (Oct. 17, 2019), urged that Regulation NMS worked well for 
securities with high volume but was not optimal for thinly traded securities: 
The secondary market for thinly traded securities faces liquidity challenges that can have a 
negative effect on both investors and issuers.  In particular, thinly traded securities, which are 
often also smaller capitalization securities, tend to have wider spreads and less displayed size 
relative to securities that trade in greater volume, often resulting in higher transaction costs for 
investors.  Potential investors in such securities also may be concerned that they could 
encounter difficulties finding the necessary liquidity to establish or unwind positions in the 
stocks.  A lack of readily available liquidity also may discourage potential market makers from 
electing to make markets in those securities. 
 71. Joint Industry Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 77724, 113 S.E.C. Docket 5971, 2016 WL 
1665163 (Apr. 27, 2016) (proposing CAT system); Proposed Amendments to the National Market System 
Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 86901, 2019 WL 8588819 
(Sept. 9, 2019) (selecting FINRA to administer Consolidated Audit Trail). 
Winter 2021              PAYMENT FOR ORDER FLOW 27 
up by more active SEC enforcement.  These solutions could potentially end 
many, if not most, of the conflicts of interest associated with payment for 
order flow and internalization.72 
Long experience with disclosure rules such as Regulation NMS Rules 
605 and 606 and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-10(d)(8), and Rule 611, 
the Order Protection Rule, vividly illustrates that these approaches can be 
evaded by market centers and broker-dealers such as Robinhood, Citadel 
Securities and options exchanges.  Often, this is not a determination to 
violate laws, but merely a determination to maximize market center and 
broker-dealer returns.  SEC enforcement to identify violations of the letter 
or spirit of the best execution principle has been erratic, often delayed, often 
content with consent settlements with defendants neither admitting nor 
denying culpability, paying a fine, and accepting imposition of an 
independent consultant to improve practices.  In essence, the SEC has relied 
on voluntary compliance of its rules under the complicated mechanics of its 
trade through and order protection rules.  Voluntary compliance too often 
does not work.73 
The wisest course for the Commission would be to address payment for 
order flow as part of a broader Special Study of Securities Markets.  To best 
appreciate financial markets today, there should be a comprehensive study 
of financial markets including study of how they have been transformed by 
technology and international trading, how substitute products such as 
financial futures or swaps are regulated by two or sometimes more agencies, 
how the very nature of trading decreasingly today is centralized in securities 
or options markets, and how securities professionals ranging from stock 
brokers, options traders, financial planners, and investment advisers create 
confusion for investors which has only been addressed to a limited degree in 
recent decades.74 
At Columbia Law School, Professor Merritt Fox and others have called 
for a new Special Study of Securities Markets.  I share with Fox the belief 
that the SEC’s 1961-1963 Special Study of Securities Markets75 is long out 
of date.  But as I stressed in my recent history of financial regulation, 
Misalignment, the new world of finance is one of product substitutes.76  I am 
skeptical that you can effectively understand securities markets today 
without also taking into account financial futures and most swaps regulated 
by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, housing finance largely 
subject to the financial policies of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and bank 
 
 72. See, e.g., Alan Ferrell, Payment for Order Flow, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2001); Note, supra 
note 53, at 1699-1691; FOX ET AL., supra note 39, at 186; SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 691. 
 73. See generally, Seligman, supra note 4; Seligman, supra note 13. 
 74. See Seligman, Another Unspecial Study:  The SEC’s Market 2000 Report and Competitive 
Developments in the United States Capital Markets, 50 BUS. LAW. 485 (1995); see also Seligman, 
Rethinking Securities Markets: The SEC’s Advisory Committee on Market Information and the Future of 
the National Market System, 57 BUS. LAW. 637 (2002). 
 75. FOX ET AL., supra note 39. 
 76. SELIGMAN, supra note 4. 
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holding companies today regulated by the Federal Reserve System, among 
other topics, outside the SEC’s jurisdiction.77 
Whether the Biden Administration SEC undertakes a narrow review of 
payment on order flow or a broader review of financial markets, the larger 
point is that the Commission would be in a better position to regulate the 
securities markets or constituent parts of the market, once it has an 
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